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Abstract 
In this article, we show that lay people's beliefs about how minds relate to bodies are more 
complex than past research suggests, and that treating them as a multidimensional construct 
helps explain inconclusive findings from the literature regarding their relation to beliefs about 
whether humans possess a free will. In two studies, we found that items previously used to 
assess a unidimensional belief in how minds relate to bodies indeed capture two 
distinguishable constructs (belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism) that 
differently predict belief in free will and two types of determinism (Studies 1 and 2). 
Additionally, we found that two fundamental personality traits pertaining to peopleÕs 
preference for experiential versus rational information processing predict those metaphysical 
beliefs that were theorized to be based on subjective phenomenological experience and 
rational deliberation, respectively (Study 2). In sum, beliefs about mind-body relations are a 
multidimensional construct with unique predictive abilities.  
 
 
Key words: lay beliefs; mind-body relations; substance dualism; reductive physicalism; free 
will; determinism; philosophy of mind; experimental philosophy  
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1. Introduction 
Questions about the metaphysical properties of reality have long fascinated students 
and scholars of many disciplinesÑfrom philosophers to theologians to hobby mycologists. 
What constitutes true knowledge? Does everything that exists serve a purpose? Is there a life 
after death, and is it really true that people always get what they deserve? 
Over the past few decades, more and more psychologists and experimental 
philosophers have become interested in how lay persons think about these Òbig questions,Ó 
facilitating empirical investigations into, for example, peopleÕs conception of whether good 
and evil are real agentic forces in the world (Bastian et al., 2015), their beliefs about 
intentionality and consciousness (Knobe & Prinz, 2008), or their theories about psychological 
phenomena such as the malleability of personality traits (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; 
Molden & Dweck, 2006) or the availability of self-control resources (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 
2010). Based on the idea of people as lay scientists who test hypotheses through observation 
of the world, psychologists believe that people develop complex belief systems about how the 
world operates, which are then used to categorize and interpret novel information (Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997).  
These belief systems not only revolve around tangible issues with real-life 
implications. In fact, many of them include ontological claimsÑviews on what constitutes 
reality or on how things really are. Studying such metaphysical beliefs can help researchers 
understand how people make sense of the word around them, rationalize their own 
phenomenological experience, or deal with the prospect of their inevitable death. It can 
further our understanding of the general processes behind belief formation and help identify 
certain common cognitive processes or biases that may be responsible for the formation of 
seemingly unrelated beliefs about metaphysical or philosophical issues. As a result, over the 
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last years, there has been extensive research on peopleÕs beliefs in these domains (Zedelius, 
Mller, & Schooler, 2017). 
As this research shows, lay beliefs are oftentimes more complex than they appear on 
the surface. To understand them, their antecedents, consequences, and relationships with other 
belief systems, scientists need to assess them accurately. It is especially crucial to capture the 
complexity of lay peopleÕs beliefs accordingly, in that people typically do not think about 
metaphysical questions like trained philosophers do, but rather apply their own common-
sense thinking to these issues (Wegener & Petty, 1998). 
In the present article, we are primarily interested in one specific metaphysical belief 
people hold, namely their belief about the relationship between mind and body. Although past 
research has often considered this belief a unidimensional construct (e.g., Hook & Farah, 
2013; Forstmann, Burgmer, & Mussweiler, 2012), in the present research, we argue in favor 
of treating it as a multidimensional construct. We further contend that such a differentiation 
helps explain inconsistent findings from the literature on metaphysical beliefs, specifically 
regarding the relationship between belief in mind-body dualism and free will beliefsÑanother 
construct that is now widely regarded as being represented by multiple unique dimensions, 
and that has long been argued to be closely tied to belief about how minds relate to bodies. 
Lastly, in line with past theorizing, we argue that certain subdimensions of both metaphysical 
beliefs are intimately linked to individual preferences for intuitive versus rational thinking 
styles, but that these thinking styles do not entirely explain the association between these 
constructs in question. 
In the following, we will discuss both the philosophical and empirical literature on 
belief in mind-body dualism and free will, followed by a section about how and why these 
constructs should be related.  
1.1.Mind-Body Dualism 
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1.1.1. Philosophical Positions on Mind-Body Relations. 
One philosophical concept that both scholars and lay people have tried to wrap their 
heads around for centuries is the relationship between mind and body, also referred to as the 
mind-body problem. The mind-body problem is a complex topic in the philosophy of mind, 
and involves both ontological questions about what mental and physical states are (e.g., 
whether they are one and the same, whether they are fundamentally distinct, or whether one is 
a subclass of the other) and questions about causal effects between the two (e.g., whether the 
mental causally effects the physical, the physical causally effects the mental, or both/none) 
(Robinson, 2017). Specifically, the debate often revolves around how the human mind (i.e., 
the self, consciousness, or intentionality) relates to the human body, with philosophers 
arguing for different kinds of monist or dualist views on this issue. 
One fundamental issue in this debate is the question whether the mind can be 
considered entirely independent of the physical realm. As the first ÒmodernÓ philosopher to 
discuss the problem in more detail, Rene Descartes (1641/1984) argued in his Meditations on 
First Philosophy that minds are separate from bodies and not part of the physical realm. For 
Descartes, the mental (the res cogitas) and the physical (the res extensa) are two distinct kinds 
of substances that make up the world, adhere to different rules, and have vastly different 
properties. While the mental substance can think and is spatially and temporally unrestricted, 
the opposite applies to the physical substance: it is spatially and temporally finite and cannot 
think.  
Descartes thus argued in favor of a view often referred to as substance dualism, that 
is, the idea that mental states are not made from (or merely the result of) physical Òstuff,Ó but 
exist as an entirely independent substance that is fundamentally non-physical in nature, and 
that can even exist in the absence of the physical. At the opposite end of the spectrum, one 
can find reductive physicalism, the view that mental states are nothing more than physical 
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states (or descriptions of physical states) and entirely reducible to this one substance (see, for 
example, Churchland (1981) for an extreme reductive physicalism referred to as eliminative 
materialism). 
However, some views fall between those two extremes. Although they 
acknowledge that only a single physical substance exists, supporters of property dualism 
argue that this substance has both physical and mental properties. Unlike in reductive 
physicalism, philosophical positions related to property dualism (such as strong emergentism 
or non-reductive physicalism; Chalmers, 1996) consider the mind to not merely be a different 
description of certain physical states, but consider it to be more than the sum of its partsÑa 
fully emergent property that is irreducible to its physical origins. However, in contrast to 
Cartesian substance dualism, these positions consider the mental property unable to exist in 
the absence of the physical substance out of which it emerges. In other words, this view holds 
that while the mind cannot be entirely reduced to its physical counterparts, it is not 
understood as a non-physical source of thought. 
Regardless of whether mind and matter are conceptualized as distinct substances or 
different properties of the same substance, philosophers who endorse a dualist view on this 
matter differ with regard to their belief in the causal relation between both constructs. Some 
positions argue that mental states are nothing but an epiphenomenon (epiphenomenalism; 
Jackson, 1986), and that only physical states can causally affect mental states. Others argue 
that there is a bi-directional influence between the two kinds of substances/properties 
(interactionism; Popper & Eccles, 1977), or that there is no causal relation between the two at 
all (e.g., parallelism, Broad, 1925/2014). 
In sum, philosophers have a variety of different takes on the mind-body problem, 
primarily differing with regard to whether they postulate the existence of one or two 
substances, one or multiple properties of a substance, as well as the causal interplay between 
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the respective concepts. Yet, and more important to the current research, how precisely do lay 
people construe the relationship between mind and body and what effects does it have? 
1.1.2. Psychological Research into Lay PeopleÕs Views on Mind-Body Relations. 
Without trying to make definite statements about the metaphysical reality 
pertaining to the issue, lay peopleÕs beliefs about how minds relate to bodies have recently 
become the focus of attention for psychologists and experimental philosophers. After all, 
although most people lack a formal education in the Philosophy of Mind, everybody knows 
what it feels like to have a mind and a body, and they are likely to have more or less elaborate 
lay theories about their relationship. How precisely people think about this complex topic, 
however, is not yet entirely understood.  
Recent theoretical considerations suggest that it makes sense to distinguish between 
peopleÕs intuitive and explicit beliefs in mind-body relations, which are informed by different 
underlying processes and potentially have unique cognitive and behavioral implications. 
While the former may be considered side-effects of more fundamental cognitive processes 
and experiences, the latter seem manifestations of culturally-shared worldviews that are 
themselves potentially informed by shared intuitions (a constructionist view), as well as by 
acquired scientific knowledge (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2017).  
Specifically, according to theoretical and empirical contributions in this domain 
(e.g., Bloom, 2004; Bering, 2006; Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015) people seem to intuitively 
think of minds and bodies as two distinct entities, a fact that already becomes evident in early 
childhood (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Hood, Gjersoe, & Bloom, 2012). As a result, some 
scholars refer to human beings as natural-born dualists (Bloom, 2004), intuitive mind-body 
dualists (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015), or implicit theists (Uhlmann et al., 2008). According 
to their theorizing [referring to Bloom and others], an intuitive belief in an unspecific mind-
body dualism can be considered a belief that most humans are readily equipped to develop in 
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some way or another. Specifically, all humans share certain fundamental cognitive processes 
that are believed to contribute to the formation of dualist beliefs. In order to be able to predict 
othersÕ behaviors, it is necessary to make inferences about their mental states (i.e., their goals, 
intentions, desires), which areÑin contrast to their physical appearance or their actual 
behaviorÑprincipally inaccessible to an observer. As a result, people learn from early on to 
distinguish between the observable-physical and the unobservable-mental world, leading to 
the development of two different modes of construal that lay the foundation for dualist beliefs 
(Bloom, 2004). In other words, some scholars suggest that dualist intuitions can be a 
considered a by-product of more fundamental cognitive processes that most human beings 
share, such as our ability and inclination to mentalize with others (i.e., to make inferences 
about unobservable minds) (Bloom, 2004; Burgmer, Forstmann, & Todd, 2018), our tendency 
to dissociate ourselves from our bodies, or our ability to engage in introspection and rely on 
internal bodily states as a source for information (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2017). 
Speaking to the universal nature of dualist belief, explicit belief in mind-body 
dualism can indeed be encountered across most cultures in human history (e.g., Slingerland & 
Chudek, 2011; Roazzi, Nyhof, & Johnson, 2013), while individualsÕ lay beliefs show 
considerable interpersonal variation (Lindeman, Riekki, & Svedholm-Hkkinen, 2015). 
Dualist thinking was theorized to form the basis of various other, more complex belief 
systems, such as in a life after death, souls, or bodiless supernatural entities (Boyer, 2001; 
Bloom, 2007). All of these beliefs rely in some form on the assumption that mental states can 
exist in the absence (or outside of) a material body (Bering, 2006). An explicit belief in non-
reductive physicalism on the other hand, may be the result of culturally acquired scientific 
knowledge overlying peopleÕs default dualist intuitions (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015; 
Preston, Ritter, & Hepler, 2013).  
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 As past research shows, whether or not people believe in mind-body dualism can have 
significant effects on their cognitions and behaviors. For example, belief in mind-body 
dualism was found to attenuate health behavior (Forstmann et al., 2012), that is, people who 
endorse this view believe to a lesser degree that bodily states affect mental well-being and 
therefore care less about their physical constitution (Burgmer & Forstmann, 2018). This may 
be one of the reasons why a dualist view on mind and body may have detrimental 
consequences in clinical settings, both on the side of doctors and patients (Mehta, 2011). 
Especially in the field of mental health, dualism may make patients skeptical about non-
biological explanations for their mental illnesses (Duncan, 2000).  
Other empirical research found that dualist beliefs moderate the effect of mortality 
salience on afterlife beliefs (Heflick, Goldenberg, Hart, & Kamp, 2015), and positively 
predict teleological reasoning, belief in god, belief in the paranormal, as well as to self-
reported purpose in life (Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). In other words, it seems as if peopleÕs 
metaphysical views can indeed have consequences for the development and maintenance of 
other, typically more tangible, belief systems, which may ultimately even affect their mental 
and physical well-being. 
Directly assessing explicit belief in mind-body dualism can, however, be a challenging 
task. Only few questionnaires directly assess this metaphysical construct, either with pictorial 
or semantic items (e.g., Forstmann et al., 2012, Hook & Farah, 2013; Stanovich, 1989, 
Nadelhoffer et al., 2014), and although some of these scales include items that seemingly 
assess different facets of belief about mind-body relations, they do not differentiate between 
these facets on an analytical level and only produce a single score for an unspecific belief in 
mind-body dualism. In other words, mind-body dualism has in the past been considered a 
single unidimensional construct, despite there being no empirical evidence supporting this 
reasoning. For example, in the Free Will Inventory (FWI) developed by Nadelhoffer and 
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colleagues (2014), the authors include a single subscale labelled Òdualism/non-reductionism,Ó 
which Òmeasures intuitions about both the existence of an immaterial soul and the 
irreducibility of the mind and the bodyÓ (Nadelhoffer & Tocchetto, 2013, p. 128). According 
to the philosophical literature discussed above, however, this definition fails to differentiate 
between belief in a substance dualism (i.e., a belief in immaterial minds or souls) and a mere 
property dualism (i.e., a belief in non-reducibility of mental states). 
To summarize, we contend that lay people have more elaborate explicit views on 
mind-body relations than past unidimensional views account for, and that it would therefore 
be reasonable to differentiate lay peopleÕs views on mind-body relations more carefully. Such 
a differentiation may help explain some puzzling finds from the past literature, such as the 
interplay between belief in the mind-body relationship and the related philosophical concept 
of belief in free will and determinism.  
1.2. Free Will and Determinism 
1.2.1. Philosophical Positions on Free Will and Determinism. 
Another philosophical question that has occupied the minds of many philosophers 
and lay people alike is the question whether human beings possess a free will, and how this 
concept can be reconciled with our knowledge about the rules of cause-and-effect that govern 
the universe. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines free will broadly as Òthe 
unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the manner necessary for 
moral responsibilityÓ (McKenna & Coates, 2016). In contrast, determinism is the view that 
every event in the universe is a causal consequence of an antecedent event, given that the laws 
of nature remain constant. Both concepts initially seem at odds with one another, and their 
relationship with moral responsibility seems obvious: how can a perpetrator be punished for 
an action ostensibly performed without coercion, if the entirety of his or her behavior is a 
necessary consequence of events that took place long before he or she was born, reaching all 
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the way back to the beginning of time? How can blame and praise be assigned if a person 
could not have acted otherwise? Philosophical views on the free will question can be broadly 
divided into two categories: those that posit that free will and determinism are two mutually 
exclusive concepts (incompatibilism), and those that posit that both concepts are compatible 
with one another (compatibilism). For many psychologists endorsing strong incompatibilist 
views, free will beliefs are an illusion, or a way for people to rationalize their own behavior 
(e.g., Wegner, 2002; Harris, 2012). According to these so-called hard incompatibilists, people 
cannot really be held morally responsible for their behavior, as their thoughts, choices, and 
actions are not of their own making. 
Compatibilists, on the other hand, understand free will as Òthe unencumbered ability 
to do as one wants,Ó that is, as the ability to act or not to act in accordance with oneÕs desires 
(Frankfurt, 1988)Ñto make unconstrained choices based on reason and deliberation. Without 
rejecting the deterministic nature of the universe, supporters of this theory do not view the 
Òabsolute ability to do otherwiseÓ as fundamental to the concept of moral responsibility, but 
rather whether or not oneÕs will conflicts at a higher level with what one wishes it to be 
(Frankfurt, 1988).  
1.2.2. Psychological Research into Lay PeopleÕs Belief in Free Will and Determinism. 
While these questions seem abstract and far-removed from reality at first glance, 
psychologists and experimentally-minded philosophers have in the last decade begun 
investigating how lay people understand the issue of free will, how these views line up with 
the philosophical literature, and how they may affect peopleÕs cognition, emotion, and 
behavior (e.g., Nichols, 2004, 2006; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2006). 
Just as with intuitions about minds and bodies, all human beings seem to share an 
inclination to perceive themselves as agents capable of making free decisions (Sarkissian et 
al., 2010), and to be in control over their own destiny (Leotti et al., 2010). They seem, 
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however, to differ with regard to how strongly they believe in this notion (Baumeister, 2008; 
Paulhus & Carey, 2011, Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005). This seems 
especially important, given that questions on the issue of free will and determinism 
immediately also raise questions about moral responsibilityÑand hence praise, blame, and 
criminal accountability (see Greene & Cohen, 2004, for a review). In fact, psychological 
research on lay theories about free will and determinism found that these beliefs indeed 
crucially affect peopleÕs cognitions and behaviors in various domains, and that they are 
important constructs that capture unique aspects of agency (Feldman, 2017). 
For example, experimental research established that peopleÕs view on the free will 
question can affect how they rationalize their own thoughts and actions: Vohs and Schooler 
(2008) found that activating a disbelief in free will via a vignette text increased participantsÕ 
likelihood to engage in cheating behavior. Similarly related to moral responsibility, 
Baumeister, Masicamo, and DeWall (2009) found that an attenuated belief in free will 
increased peopleÕs hostility and reduced their pro-social inclinations, while Martin, Rigoni, 
and Vohs (2017) discovered that in cultures with low corruption levels free will belief 
predicts positive attitudes towards punishment and intolerance of unethical behavior. Some of 
these effects on attitudes and behavior can be attributed to free will belief affecting 
fundamental cognitive processes: as recent research shows, belief in a free will increases the 
likelihood of overattributing othersÕ behavior to internal states as opposed to external 
circumstancesÑthe correspondence bias (Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). 
Other experimental findings revealed effects of free-will-related lay theories on 
conformity (Alquist, Ainsworth, & Baumeister, 2013), self-control (Rigoni, Kuhn, Gaudino, 
Sartori, & Brass, 2011), error detection (Rigoni, Pourtois, & Brass, 2015), gratitude 
(MacKenzie, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2014), counterfactual thinking (Alquist, Ainsworth, & 
Baumeister, 2015), or how much people learn from negative experiences (Stillman & 
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Baumeister, 2010), while some of the correlates of free will belief include academic and job 
performance (Feldman, Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016; Stillman et al., 2010), self-efficacy 
(Baumeister & Brewer, 2012), and decisiveness  (Feldman, Baumeister, & Wong, 2014). 
One prevalent concern in these studies, however, is that the notions of free will and 
determinism are often treated as two poles of one single construct rather than two 
distinguishable constructs. This becomes evident both in experimental manipulations (e.g., by 
Vohs and Schooler, 2008) and individual-difference measures such as the ones developed by 
Viney, Waldman, and Barchilon (1982) (including unidimensional items such as "Where do 
you stand with respect to the free will / determinism issue?"), or Rakos, Laurene, Skala, and 
Slane (2008) (producing a single score ranging from Òmost deterministicÓ to Òmost 
libertarianÓ). These scales follow an incompatibilist view on free will and determinsim, 
despite the fact that compatibilism is the view that most contemporary philosophers endorse 
(Bourget & Chalmers, 2013). This is insofar problematic in that more and more research 
points towards the notion that belief in compatibilism is not just an idea that educated 
philosophers endorse, but rather a concept that many lay people can agree with (Nahmias et 
al., 2006). According to Monroe and Malle (2010), lay people understand free will as Òa 
choice that fulfills oneÕs desires, [É] free from internal or external constraintsÓ (p. 211), and 
this understanding is neither associated with elaborate assumptions about (in-)determinism 
nor supernatural claims about the existence of souls. Consistently, recent empirical work 
indicates that lay people indeed understand free will primarily as having unconstrained choice 
(Vonasch, Baumeister, & Mele, 2018). 
Confirming Monroe and MalleÕs (2010) reasoning, in a more recently developed 
questionnaire (the FWI), Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014) found that participantsÕ responses 
were indeed best explained by two different and uncorrelated factors, representing belief in 
free will and determinism, respectively. A similar factor structure was found in a scale 
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developed by Paulhus and Carey (2011), further differentiating between two kinds of 
deterministic belief (fatalistic vs. scientific).  
In one of the first experimental investigations into this topic, Nahmias and 
colleagues (2005; 2006) investigated folk intuitions about determinism and moral 
responsibility. They found that people ascribed responsibility to a criminal offender even after 
they were told that the actions took place in a fully deterministic universe. Nichols and Knobe 
(2007) further added to these findings, showing that compatibilist intuitions only occur when 
people make affect-laden judgments about responsibility. When judgments were more 
abstract, people revealed incompatibilist views.  
As such, research on peopleÕs belief in free will and determinism has already 
established that lay peopleÕs views are not as simplistic as earlier approaches seem to suggest, 
and that it is best advised to assess these beliefs as multifaceted constructs. As we argued 
above, we think that a similar approach should be followed for belief about mind-body 
relations, which, as we will outline in the following, are closely linked to belief in free will 
and determinism. 
1.3. Mind-Body Dualism & Free Will 
 The relationship between the two kinds of metaphysical beliefs introduced above, 
seems intuitive: when holding a belief in fully unconstrained free will, that is, in an agent who 
possesses the absolute ability to do otherwise, the mind cannot be construed as strictly 
physical in nature when one accepts the legitimacy of the laws of nature. Only if the mind is 
construed as unaffected by the laws of cause and effect can an action be fully attributed to it 
(e.g., Montague, 2008; although this view is challenged by Mele, 2014). In other words, a 
belief in free will should require a belief in a second, non-physical substance that Òdoes the 
thinkingÓ and that can causally affect the physical world (an interactionist dualist view). 
Conversely, a belief in reductive physicalism fits a deterministic worldview, in which there is 
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no room for an uncaused agentic force, or a Òfirst mover.Ó How views in line with a property 
dualism affect belief in free will and determinism, respectively, is less self-evident and should 
depend on additional assumptions about causality. 
Past research on the relation between the constructs involved was oftentimes theoretic 
in nature or utilized scales that do not make a sufficient distinction between them. In one of 
the rare cases of empirical investigations into this topic, Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014) 
found that a unidimensional dualism/non-reductionism subscale of their FWI positively 
correlated with belief in free will, yet did not significantly correlate with belief in 
determinism. Notably, although belief in dualism and free will were correlated, they clearly 
loaded on two distinct factors, indicating that they are indeed two distinguishable constructs.  
Why no correlation with belief in determinism was found, however, remains an open 
question. The overall pattern was replicated (using the same scale) in another study by 
Nadelhoffer and Tocchetto (2013), albeit with a slightly weaker correlation, and was also 
recently found using two different scales (Fernandez-Duque & Schwartz, 2016). Monroe and 
Malle (2010), on the other hand, reported that when deliberating about free will, participants 
did not spontaneously evoke concepts of dualism or other related metaphysical concepts. This 
sentiment was supported by a small-scale survey by Mele (2014), in which participants still 
ascribed free will to a target even after a physicalist worldview was rendered salient, yet not 
when they were told the target was under the influence of a compliance drug. Likewise, 
Nahmias, Shepard, and Reuter (2014) found that participants considered an actor to possess 
free will and responsibility, even when they were told that his or her actions could be 
perfectly predicted from neural information.  
 Lastly, it is possible that both peopleÕs lay conception of mind-body relations and their 
idea about the existence of free will are related to a single more basic belief, mindset, or 
thinking style. As shown by Forstmann and Burgmer (2015) and theorized by Bloom (2004), 
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peopleÕs intuitive belief in an unspecific mind-body dualism seems to be based on their 
intuitionsÑtheir phenomenological experience of the world. Likewise, as outlined above, 
some researchers assume that believing in free will is the result of an intuition that is 
grounded in our perception of our own thoughts and actions (Sarkissian et al., 2010; Leotti et 
al., 2010). In both cases, rational thought is needed to overcome oneÕs intuitions and to arrive 
at an arguably more abstract and complex worldview. Thus, the degree to which people prefer 
to engage in deliberative or experiential information processing, that is, their need for 
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and their faith in intuition (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & 
Heier, 1996) may be related to some of the more rational and intuition-based facets of both 
constructs, respectively.  
2. The Present Research 
 We designed the present research with three goals in mind. First, our primary goal was 
to test, whether lay people conceptualize mind-body relations as a multidimensional 
construct. To that end, we used factor analysis to determine whether items typically used to 
calculate a unidimensional belief in mind-body dualism score (Hook & Farah, 2013) in fact 
load on two distinct factors (representing belief in substance dualism and reductive 
physicalism, respectively). Second, we tested, whether the two isolated dimensions can help 
explain the inconclusive findings regarding the association between dualist belief and belief 
in free will and determinism found in past research. To that end, we used regression-based 
and correlational approaches to test how the two factors uniquely predict the two dimensions 
of belief in free will and determinism identified by Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014) (Study 
1).  
Third, we investigated whetherÑas theory suggestÑcertain facets of the two 
constructs are related to personality traits that pertain to a general preference for experiential 
versus rational information processingÑthat is, peopleÕs need for cognition and their faith in 
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intuition. At the same time, we replicated and further differentiated our primary results by 
using a different scale for belief in free will-related constructs that allows for a 
disentanglement of multiple kinds of deterministic beliefs (Paulhus & Carey, 2011) (Study 2). 
2.1. Data Reporting and Analysis 
For all studies reported below, we attest to reporting all variables assessed, all 
conditions realized, as well as all subject exclusions that took place prior to data analysis. In 
all studies, participants were only excluded if they responded positively to a question asking 
them whether they answered to one or multiple questions randomly or in purposefully wrong 
manner. We aimed for sample sizes beyond a minimum of 250 participants per study to be 
able to reliably detect small correlations, and to arrive at a precise estimate of the strength of 
correlation between the variables involved (Schnbrodt & Perugini, 2013). 
2.2. Study 1 
As outlined above, the goal of our first study was to investigate the basic relationship 
between belief about mind-body relations and free will/determinism. To that end, we planned 
on analyzing the factor structure of items previously used to assess a unidimensional belief in 
mind-body dualism. Based on an initial screening of the items, we expected them to load on 
two distinct factors (representing belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism, 
respectively) that would each differentially correlate with the two free-will-related subscales 
identified by Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014). In line with past studies and the theoretical 
considerations outlined above, we hypothesized that those facets of the questionnaire that 
exclusively assess belief in substance dualism would positively predict free will beliefs. We 
were agnostic with regard to any correlation between substance dualism and belief in 
determinism, as past studies painted a less clear picture with regard to these two constructs. 
Similar, we were agnostic about how reductive physicalism may relate to free will and 
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determinism beliefs, but considered it a possibility that reductive physicalism may be 
associated with belief in determinism. 
2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants and design. We recruited 400 participants from AmazonÕs 
Mechanical Turk website, who participated in exchange for a moderate monetary 
compensation. All participants worked on the same two questionnaires presented in random 
order. 
Of the 400 participants, 36 were excluded based on the single item assessing 
random/misleading responding described above, leaving us with a final sample of 364 
participants (178 female, 185 male, 1 other/none; MAge = 36.37, SD = 11.93). 
2.2.1.2. Materials and procedure. After giving their informed consent, participants 
worked on two questionnaires presented in random order. Depending on order of 
measurements, they either first worked on two of the subscales of the Free Will Inventory by 
Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014) or a mind-body relations scale adapted from Hook and 
Farah (2013). At the end of the study, participants answered demographic questions as well as 
one question assessing whether participants gave intentionally misleading or random answers 
to some of the questions.  
Free Will Inventory. To assess participantsÕ belief in free will and determinism, 
participants were asked to work on two subscales of the Free Will Inventory (Part I) 
developed by Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014), designed to assess both constructs on 
separate subscales. Specifically, participants were asked to indicate their agreement with 10 
statements, presented in random order, using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Five of the items comprise the free will subscale, and include 
statements such as ÒPeople always have the ability to do otherwiseÓ or ÒHow peopleÕs lives 
unfold is completely up to them.Ó The remaining five items comprise the determinism 
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subscale, including statements such as ÒEverything that has ever happened had to happen 
precisely as it did, given what happened beforeÓ or ÒA supercomputer that could know 
everything about the way the universe is now could know everything about the way the 
universe will be in the future.Ó 
Mind-Body Relations Scale. To assess participants common sense belief about mind 
body relations, we administered a scale that we created by combining all twelve items used in 
the various studies presented by Hook and Farah (2013; see Table 1 for the full scale). 
Although the FWI (Part I) included a dualism subscale, we opted for this specific 
questionnaire, as its items seemed to cover a wider array of beliefs. We also decided to 
include a larger number of items (at once) than the original authors, to increase internal 
consistency of the scale and help determine a more accurate factor structure.  
Participants were told that the questionnaire was assessing how people think about 
mind, brain, and behavior, and that there were no right or wrong answers. Then, participants 
were asked to indicate on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree 
completely) how strongly they agreed with each of twelve statements (likewise presented in 
random order) pertaining to the relationship between these entities. Example items from this 
questionnaire are ÒThe mind is fundamentally physicalÓ or ÒEach of us has a soul that is 
separate from the body.Ó 
Demographic questions. After working on the two questionnaires, participants 
responded to a selection of demographic questions, assessing age, gender (male; female; 
other/none), whether or not they were native speakers (yes/no), nationality, current location, 
highest level of education (6 levels from ÒschoolÓ to ÒPhDÓ), and political orientation (from 1 
(very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). Some of these demographics were intended to be used 
as control variables in the regression analyses, as it is conceivable that some of them share 
variance with belief in substance dualism and/or free will (e.g., age, political orientation), 
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belief in reductive physicalism and/or determinism (e.g., education), or comprehension of 
theÑrather complexÑitem wording (e.g., education, native speaker). 
2.2.2. Results and Discussion 
 Factor structure of the Mind-Body Relations Scale. To test whether, similar to the free 
will construct, belief about mind-body relations is a multidimensional construct, we 
conducted a principal component analysis with Varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization on 
the twelve items comprising the mind-body relations scale. Factor loadings for the rotated 
solution can be found in Table 1. The rotation converged in three iterations, and two factors 
were extracted with an Eigenvalue of greater than 1, which explained a combined 64.1% of 
the total variance. As expected, the first factor corresponds to a belief in substance dualism, 
and comprises items that refer to a belief in souls or other parts of the self that can survive 
physical death. Only two of the items do not share such a metaphysical connotation, and 
merely make general statements with regard to the non-reductive nature of the mind. These 
items, however, reveal the weakest factor loadings on this factor.  
The second factor we identified corresponds to a reductive physicalist view on mind 
and body, and revolves around statements that claim that mental processes are entirely 
reducible to activity in the brain. Only one itemÑagain with the weakest factor loadingÑ
corresponds to a belief in emergentism, that is, that mental states emerge from brain states but 
are not reducible to brain states.  
 As such, both factors seem to indeed assess unique constructs, as a lack of belief in a 
soul or another part of the self that survives physical death (i.e, a lack of a belief in substance 
dualism) does not necessarily mean that a reductive physicalist view of the world must be 
endorsed. For example, a property dualist would score low values on both subscales. And 
indeed, we found that both factors were strongly, but not perfectly negatively correlated in our 
sample, r(364) = -.536, p < .001, 95% CI = [-0.613; -0.450]. 
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Table 1  







Each of us has a soul that is separate from the body. .866 (.843)  
Some spiritual part of us survives after death. .843 (.824)  
Though our bodies die, our minds (consciousness, memory, 
will) can survive. 
.822 (.758)  
Some nonmaterial part of me (my mind, soul, or spirit) 
determines my behavior. 
.810 (.804)  
Minds are inside brains but not the same as brains. .631 (.582)  
The mind is a nonmaterial substance that interacts with the 
brain to determine behavior. 
.610 (.716)  
All mental processes are the result of activity in the nervous 
system. 
 .829 (.712) 
All of my conscious experience is the result of activity in my 
nervous system. 
 .776 (.734) 
The mind is fundamentally physical.  .736 (.675) 
When I use the word ÒmindÓ it is just a shorthand term for the 
complicated things my brain does. 
 .710 (.795) 
The mind and the brain are the same thing. -.431 .701 (.780) 
My mind (consciousness, memory, will) is an emergent 
property of my brain and cannot be separated from it. 
 .617 (.695) 
Notes. Rotated factor loadings for the twelve items comprising the mind-body relations scale 
from Studies 1 and 2. Factor loadings smaller than .4 are not displayed. Values in parentheses are 
for Study 2. 
 
  We therefore created individual mean scores for the items loading on the substance dualism 
factor (CronbachÕs α = .90), and the items on the reductive physicalism factor (α = .87), 
respectively. To be able to compare our results with previous findings, we also created a mean 
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score for all items, with greater values indicating greater dualism/non-reductive-physicalism 
belief (α = .91). 
 Correlational analyses (single score). Consistent with findings by Nadelhoffer and 
colleagues (2014), we found a negative correlation between the two subscales assessing belief 
in free will and determinism, r(364) = -.174, p = .001, 95% CI = [-0.308; -0.042]. More 
importantly, however, the overall dualism/non-reductive-physicalism index significantly 
correlated with belief in free will in a positive direction, r(364) = .196, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[0.075; 0.313]. Participants who indicated a greater belief in dualism (or a lack of belief in 
reducibility of mental states to brain states) had a greater tendency to agree with statements 
that posit the idea that humans have a free will and can choose their destiny. Also consistent 
with their findings, the combined dualism/non-reductive-physicalism score did not 
significantly correlate with belief in determinism, r(364) = .042, p = .419, 95% CI = [-0.073; 
0.154].  
This pattern replicates Nadelhoffer and colleaguesÕ (2014) findingsÑthe authors also 
found their dualism scale to positively correlate with free will beliefs, yet found no significant 
association between beliefs in dualism and determinism. However, the lack of a relationship 
between the latter two constructs seems surprising at first. While it makes intuitive sense that 
a belief in a mind that is an uncaused causal agent is a requirement for belief in true free will, 
it seems counterintuitive that oneÕs views on the reducibility of the mind to the brain do not 
have anything to do with oneÕs view on whether the world is physically pre-determined, in a 
way that the laws of nature guarantee that everything has to happen the way it does. 
 Correlational analyses (two factors). This issue becomes clearer, however, when 
instead of using a single dualism/non-reductive-physicalism score, one includes the two 
subscales of the mind-body-relations scale we identified earlier in the analysis. Specifically, 
we were able to differentiate the unique roles that the substance dualism and reductive 
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physicalism factors play in the relationship between belief in free will/determinism and belief 
about mind-body relations. That is, we were able to analyze how belief in substance dualism 
and belief in reductive physicalism individually correlate with both belief in free will and 
determinism.  
Results of our analysis revealed that belief in substance dualism indeed correlates with 
belief in free will, that is, peopleÕs ability to choose and affect their own destiny, r(364) = 
.247, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.132; 0.355]. In other words, a belief in a mind that exists outside 
the physical realm and that Òdoes the thinkingÓ seems to be strongly associated with (and 
maybe a prerequisite for) a strong belief in a free will and humansÕ ability to causally affect 
their future. Whether or not people believed in reductive physicalism, however, did not 
correlate with their free will belief, r(364) = -.075, p = .151, 95% CI = [-0.189; 0.039]. 
When it comes to the previously reported null finding regarding the association 
between mind-body beliefs and belief in determinism, differentiating the two mind-body 
beliefs revealed the reason for this absence of correlation. On its own, a belief in reductive 
physicalism positively correlates with belief in determinism, r(364) = .107, p = .041, 95% CI 
= [-0.008; 0.221]. That is, as common sense would suggest, the belief that minds are nothing 
above and beyond brain states fits the idea of a cause-and-effect universe in which no 
metaphysical elements are at play. Unexpectedly, however, belief in substance dualism 
similarly correlates with belief in a deterministic world, and likewise in a positive direction, 
r(364) =.148, p = .005, 95% CI = [0.029; 0.267]. Specifically, these results indicate that a 
greater belief in a metaphysical substance dualism positively predicts responses on a scale 
assessing peopleÕs belief in the predetermined nature of the universe. The fact that both types 
of mind-body beliefs positively predict determinism explains the lack of correlation that weÑ
and other authorsÑfound between a unidimensional dualism score and belief in determinism.  
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Regression analyses. We also analyzed the data using two regression analyses 
predicting free will and determinism beliefs, respectively. In both cases, we predicted the 
outcome variable with the second, not predicted subscale (e.g., the free will subscale when 
predicting determinism) of the FWI (to account for intercorrelation between the two 
subscales), the two mind-body subscales we identified (as our prime subject of interest), as 
well as the control variables age, gender (dummy-coded), being a native English speaker or 
not, education (dummy-coded), and political orientation. Results show, that both substance 
dualism (β = .396, SE = .065, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.269; 0.524]), and reductive physicalism 
(β = .270, SE = .058, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.156; 0.384]) uniquely, and positively, predict a 
belief in determinism. In fact, both dimensions did not significantly differ in their predictive 
power, Z = 1.446, p = .148. Conversely, as hypothesized, free will beliefs were also 
significantly predicted by belief in substance dualism, β = .341, SE = .067, p < .001, 95% CI 
= [0.208; 0.473]. Unlike in the correlations reported above, however, in a second regression 
analysis, belief in reductive physicalism did also positively predict free will beliefs (β = .136, 
SE = .0061, p = .026, 95% CI = [0016; 0.254]), albeit to a significantly lesser degree than 
belief in substance dualism, Z = 2.279, p = .023 (Table 2). That is, even when controlling for 
various demographic covariates and the intercorrelation between free will and determinism 
beliefs (as well as substance dualism and reductive physicalism beliefs), both substance 
dualism and reductive physicalism predict belief in determinism to a similar degree, whereas 
it is primarily belief in substance dualism that predicts belief in a free will. 
 
Table 2 
Regression results Study 1 
 Free Will  Determinism  
Substance Dualism 0.341 *** 0.396 *** 
Reductive Physicalism 0.136 * 0.270 *** 
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Free Will -  -0.254 *** 
Determinism -0.266 *** -  
Notes. Results of two regression analyses of Study 1, predicting the 
two dimensions of the Free Will Inventory included. Not included in 
this table are results for the control variables: age, gender, native 
speaker, education, and political orientation. Values represent 
standardized beta coefficients. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05. 
 
To follow up on these findings, we designed a second study to investigate the 
relationship between the constructs involved in more detail. Specifically, having shown a 
differential relation between beliefs in substance dualism, reductive physicalism, and free 
will, we designed the next study to investigate why both beliefs in substance dualism and 
reductive physicalism similarly predicted belief in determinism. 
 
2.3. Study 2 
 In the second study, our goal was to investigate the relationship between the relevant 
constructs in more detail by including a more fine-grained questionnaire assessing various 
dimensions of free-will-related beliefs. We thereby set out to replicate the results of Study 1 
and to extend them by trying to isolate the relationship between the two newly-identified 
subdimensions of belief about mind-body relations and different subcomponents of free will 
belief. 
In addition, we also included a single-item measure for belief about mind-body 
relations that has been used in past research (e.g.,Forstmann et al., 2012; Burgmer & 
Forstmann, 2018; Marshall, Lilienfeld, Mayberg, & Clark, 2017). So far, it is not known 
whether this pictorial measure rather assesses peopleÕs belief in substance dualism or in 
reductive physicalism, how it compares to other semantic scales assessing the same 
constructs, and how predictive it is of free will-related beliefs.  
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Lastly, as outlined in the Introduction, another goal of this study was to investigate 
how the different facets of the two metaphysical beliefs we observed in Study 1 relate to basic 
thinking styles. Specifically, individual differences in preference for experiential information 
processing (or Òfaith in intuitionÓ) should be related to both belief in free will and substance 
dualism, as these beliefs are argued to be a function of our intuitive phenomenological 
experience (e.g., Bloom, 2004). Conversely, we expected the more abstract and ÒrationalÓ 
constructs of determinism and reductive physicalism to be associated with a greater need for 
cognition, that is, a preference for rational information processing (Epstein et al., 1996). 
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants and design. Based on the effect sizes observed in the first study, 
we recruited 301 participants from AmazonÕs Mechanical Turk website, who participated in 
exchange for a moderate monetary compensation. Participants worked on four questionnaires, 
the first two of which were again presented in random order. Of the 301 participants, four 
were excluded on the basis of self-admitted random/milsleading responding, leaving us with a 
final sample of 297 participants (156 female, 140 male, 1 other/none; MAge = 33.17, SD = 
10.64). 
2.3.1.2. Materials and procedure. First, after indicating agreement with the consent 
form, participants worked on two questionnaires assessing belief about mind-body relations. 
First, they worked on the modified Hook and Farah (2013) mind-body relations scale 
introduced in Study 1, followed by an established single item pictorial measure for general 
mind-body relations used in previous studies on mind-body dualism (e.g., Forstmann et al., 
2012). Loosely based on the Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 
1992), this item presents participants with seven diagrams, each depicting two circles on a 
horizontal line with continually increasing degrees of overlap, ranging from full separation to 
full overlap. Participants are then asked to indicate which of the constellations best represents 
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their idea of how minds relate to bodies. Selecting a constellation with greater overlap 
between the circles thus indicated either a greater belief in some form of monism or a lesser 
belief in some form of dualism. Whether this item rather assesses belief in substance dualism 
or reductive physicalism (i.e., which factor of the mind-body relations scale used in Study 1), 
however, is so far unclear. Still, in order to gain insight into this matter, we decided to include 
this pictorial item in the present study. 
Subsequently, participants worked on the Free Will and Determinism Scale (FAD-
Plus) by Paulhus and Carey (2011). Unlike the FWI (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) we used in 
Study 1, the FAD-Plus assesses four distinct dimensions of free will/determinism belief, by 
asking participants to indicate their agreement with each of 27 statements, using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely). Specifically, 
the FAD-Plus comprises the dimensions free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic 
determinism, and unpredictability. The free will subscale captures a belief comparable to what 
is assessed by Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014) free will subscale, that is, a belief in 
peopleÕs ability to causally affect their own destiny. It includes items such as ÒPeople have 
complete control over the decisions they make,Ó or ÒPeople can overcome any obstacles if 
they truly want to.Ó  
Further, unlike the Free Will Inventory, the FAD-Plus assesses two unique kinds of 
belief in determinism: scientific determinism captures peopleÕs belief in that everything is 
determined by its past (or its biological makeup), and that everything is governed by the 
physical laws of cause and effect. This subscale includes items such as ÒAs with other 
animals, human behavior always follows the laws of natureÓ or ÒYour genes determine your 
future.Ó Fatalistic determinism, on the other hand, similarly constitutes a belief in that 
everything that happens is pre-determined, yet invokes a metaphysical explanation (e.g., fate, 
destiny) for this rationale. Items on this subscale include ÒFate already has a plan for 
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everyoneÓ or ÒNo matter how hard you try, you canÕt change your destiny.Ó The last subscale 
of the FAD-Plus, unpredictability, assesses a belief in the unpredictability of the future, and 
the belief that most things that happen in the world are a result of chance events or 
randomness. It includes items such as ÒWhat happens to people is a matter of chanceÓ or 
ÒPeople are unpredictable.Ó 
Lastly, all participants responded to the RationalÐExperiential Inventory (REI), a 
questionnaire assessing trait preferences for rational versus experiential information 
processing (Epstein et al., 1996) that is comprised of two subscales labeled need for cognition 
and faith in intuition. Need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) refers to peopleÕs 
tendency to willfully engage in effortful cognitive activities such as intellectual deliberation, 
and assesses peopleÕs agreement with five statements using a 7-point Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely). Items include statements such 
as ÒI prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something that 
requires little thoughtÓ or ÒI don't like to have to do a lot of thinkingÓ (reverse-coded). 
Conversely, faith in intuition assesses trait reliance on heuristics and affect-based decision-
making, and is similarly assessed through agreement with five statements, including 
statements such as ÒI trust my initial feelings about peopleÓ or ÒI believe in trusting my 
hunches.Ó 
As intuitive dualism potentially arises from intuitions based on phenomenological 
experience (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015, 2017; Bloom, 2004), and free will beliefs similarly 
seem to derive from phenomenological states pertaining to intentions and actions, they may 
both be related to the same underlying personality trait (that is, faith in intuition). Likewise, 
both reductive physicalism and determinism are evidently linked to counterintuitive, abstract 
reasoningÑeither regarding the cause-and-effect nature of the universe or the reducibility of 
mental states to brain states. Thus, we decided to include both need for cognition and faith in 
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intuition in our regression analyses for Study 2, in addition to the same control variables 
included in Study 1.  
At the end of the study, we again assessed demographic variables as well as whether 
participants self-admittedly gave misleading or random responses to some of the questions. 
2.3.2. Results and Discussion 
 The factor structure of the mind-body relations questionnaire was similar to the 
structure we established in Study 1. Two factors with Eigenvalues greater than 1 emerged, 
cumulatively accounting for 62.5% of variance. The six items loading the strongest on each 
factor were the same items as in Study 1, with only slightly different factor loadings (see 
Table 1).   
 As in Study 1, we created indices for the subscales of the various questionnaires 
included in this study. Again, both the substance dualism (α = .88) and the reductive 
physicalism (α = .87) scales were reliable. Similarly, the four subscales of the FAD-Plus, free 
will (α = .83), scientific determinism (α = .70), fatalistic determinism (α = .88), and 
unpredictability (α = .74), revealed good internal consistency. The same was true for the two 
scales comprising the REI, that is, need for cognition (α = .87) and faith in intuition (α = .91). 
 Correlational analyses (two factors). Analyzing the raw correlations between the 
subscales of the mind-body relations questionnaire and the FAD-Plus, we replicated the key 
finding from Study 1. Belief in free will belief once more correlated positively with belief in 
substance dualism, r(297) = .169, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.043; 0.285], but not with belief in 
reductive physicalism, r(297) = .022, p = .709, 95% CI = [-0.099; 0.153]. Further, the FAD-
Plus sheds more light on the pattern observed for belief in determinism in Study 1: there, both 
substance dualism and reductive physicalism surprisingly correlated positively with 
determinism, explaining the null-correlation found between determinism and the single 
aggregate dualism/non-reductive-physicalism score initially calculated. In the present study, 
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the relationship between the concepts involved becomes clearer. We found belief in substance 
dualism to substantially correlate with fatalistic determinism, that is, the metaphysical belief 
in destiny or fate, r(297) = .482, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.373; 0.581], while revealing a weaker 
(and negative) correlation with belief in scientific determinism, r(297) = -.131, p = .024, 95% 
CI = [-0.261; -0.003]. In contrast, belief in reductive physicalism revealed an almost reverse 
pattern: while it correlated strongly with belief in scientific determinism, r(297) = .462, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.354; 0.558], it only revealed a weak (and negative) correlation with belief 
in fatalistic determinism, r(297) = -.117, p = .044, 95% CI = [-0.239; 0.012]. In addition, only 
reductive physicalism correlated significantly with the unpredictability subscale of the FAD-
Plus, r(297) = .229, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.110; 0.338], while belief in substance dualism 
revealed no significant correlation with unpredictability, r(297) = -.018, p = .758, 95% CI = [-
0.141; 0.113].  
 The single pictorial mind-body relations item (with higher values representing higher 
dualism/non-reductive-physicalism scores) revealed only one significant correlation, namely a 
positive correlation with belief in scientific determinism, r(297) = .149, p = .010, 95% CI = 
[0.030; 0.267]. The remaining correlations with the subscales of the FAD-Plus turned out 
non-significant (all ps > .180). This pattern seems to resemble the results for the reductive 
physicalism subscale of the questionnaire adapted from Hook and Farah (2013). It thus seems 
as if this pictorial item measures peopleÕs belief in the complete reducibility of mental states 
to brain states rather than a belief in a mind that is a substance outside of the physical realm. 
This hypothesis is supported by the results of a regression analysis, predicting scores on this 
pictorial item with the two subscales of the mind-body relations questionnaire. Controlling for 
their intercorrelation, only reductive physicalism predicted scores on the pictorial item, β = 
.345, SE = .067, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.016; 0.254], while substance dualism did not predict 
scores on this item, β = -.020, SE = .067, p = .767, 95% CI = [-0.151; 0.111]. For these 
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reasons, we decided to focus our further analyses on the two-factorial mind-body relations 
scale. 
 Regression analyses. To account for intercorrelations between the subscales, as well as 
to control for demographic variables and the two personality dimensions assessed with the 
REI, we conducted individual regression analysesÑsimilar to the ones performed in Study 
1Ñin addition to the correlations reported above, predicting all four subscales of the FAD-
Plus (see Table 3).  
 Importantly, while controlling for the various demographics and personality variables, 
we found the same (if not more pronounced) pattern of results as in the correlational analyses 
reported above. Belief in substance dualism still predicted belief in free will, β = .275, SE = 
.075, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.128; 0.422], and belief in fatalistic determinism, β = .557, SE = 
.061, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.437; 0.678], whereas it did not predict belief in scientific 
determinism, β = .012, SE = .074, p = .867, 95% CI = [-0.133; 0.158], or unpredictability, β = 
.042, SE = .083, p = .610, 95% CI = [-0.121; 0.206]. 
 Conversely, belief in reductive physicalism predicted belief in scientific determinism, 
β = .486, SE = .064, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.361; 0.611], and uncontrollability, β = .230, SE = 
.078, p = .003, 95% CI = [0.078; 0.382], while it did not predict belief in free will, β = .092, 
SE = .072, p = .203, 95% CI = [-0.050; 0.234], or fatalistic determinism, β = .072, SE = .066, 
p = .277, 95% CI = [-0.058; 0.202].   
 Analyzing the predictive power of the two personality variables assessed by the REI, 
the regression analyses revealed thatÑin line with the theoretical arguments found in the 
literatureÑfaith in intuition primarily predicted belief in free will, β = .275, SE = .054, p < 
.001, 95% CI = [0.168; 0.383], and to a lesser extent the two determinism subscales 
(fatalistic: β = .091, SE = .052, p = .079, 95% CI = [-0.011; 0.194]; scientific: β = .111, SE = 
.055, p = .044, 95% CI = [0.003; 0.219]). Thus, it seems indeed to be the case that a belief in 
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free will is a product of intuitions we have about intentionality, causality, and behavior.  
Need for cognition, that is, oneÕs preference for engaging in effortful cognitive 
elaboration, on the other hand, negatively predicted belief in fatalistic determinismÑthe 
belief in fate and destiny, β = -.128, SE = .048, p = .009, 95% CI = [-0.223; -0.033], as well as 
in unpredictability, β = -.144, SE = .057, p = .013, 95% CI = [-0.257; -0.030]. These 
relationships make intuitive sense, as both belief in chance/randomness and in fate can be 
considered simple answers to the complex problems of free will, determinism, and its related 
constructs, that may not be easily adopted by people high in need for cognition. 
 Lastly, we investigated how predictive need for cognition and faith in intuition are of 
belief in substance dualism and reductive physicalism, respectively. Similarly supporting 
claims found in the literature, in two regression analyses, we found that only faith in intuition, 
β = .225, SE = .057, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.113; 0.337], but not need for cognition, β = -.029, 
SE = .057, p = .614, 95% CI = [-0.141; 0.083], predicted belief in substance dualism. Neither 
need for cognition nor faith in intuition significantly predicted belief in reductive physicalism 
(ps > .200). Thus, similar to belief in free will, belief in substance dualism seems to be related 
to our preference for intuitive thinking, a notion that supports the hypothesis that this specific 
belief is rooted in our subjective phenomenological experience of the world. Yet, preferences 
for the two thinking styles did not fully explain the relationship found between belief in free 
will and in substance dualism. In other words, even though both seem to be related to intuitive 
thinking, it still seems as if the concept of free will is intimately linked (and maybe logically 
dependent) on a belief in a mental substance that is not affected by the law of cause and 
effects that governs the physical universe. 
 In sum, results of the second study show that while a belief in souls or minds that exist 
outside of the physical realm positively predicts a belief in free will, both belief in substance 
dualism and reductive physicalism have a more nuanced relationship with belief in 
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determinism. While a belief in substance dualism seems to predict a belief in the world being 
pre-determined by destiny or fate, a belief in reductive physicalism predicts belief in the 
world being pre-determined by the laws of physics. However, a belief in reductive 
physicalism must not necessarily lead to a belief in a determined universe: as some sort of 
counterpart to belief in free will, reductive physicalism still allows to attribute future events to 
chance or randomness (i.e., unpredictability), thereby giving the option to reject the notion of 
any sort of pre-determination.  
 
3. General Discussion 
The current research explored peopleÕs views on mind-body relations and their 
relationship with belief in free will and determinism. Inspired by past research suggesting that 
belief in free will and determinism are two distinct dimensions (in a sense that lay people are 
intuitive compatibilists) rather than the two poles of a single dimension, we analyzed the 
Table 3 
Regression results Study 2 
 Free Will Sci. Determ. Fatal. Determ. Unpredictability 
Subs. Dualism 0.275 *** 0.012  0.557 *** 0.042  
Red. Physicalism 0.092  0.486 *** 0.072  0.230 ** 
Free Will - 0.130 * -0.288 *** 0.212 ** 
Sci. Determ. 0.139 * - 0.279 *** -0.009  
Fatal. Determ. -0.346 *** 0.312 *** - 0.184 ** 
Unpredictability 0.179 * -0.007  0.130  - 
Need for cognition 0.062  0.007  -0.128 ** -0.144 * 
Faith in intuition 0.275 *** 0.111 * 0.091   0.066  
Notes. Results of four regression analyses of Study 2, predicting the four dimension of the 
FAD-Plus scale. Not included in this table are results for the control variables: age, gender, 
native speaker, education, and political orientation. Values represent standardized beta 
coefficients. *** = p < .001; ** = p < .01; * = p < .05;   = p < .10. 
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factor structure of a commonly used set of items assessing belief about mind-body relations 
and discovered a similar pattern. While negatively correlated, beliefs in substance dualism 
and reductive physicalism turned out to be individual dimensions that each uniquely predicted 
different facets of belief in free will and determinism. Specifically, in two studies, we found 
that only substance dualism, but not reductive physicalism predicted belief in free will, that is, 
peopleÕs ability to choose their own destiny. In addition, while past research reports no 
correlations between single dualism/non-reductive-physicalism measures and belief in 
determinism (e.g., Nadelhoffer et al., 2014), we provide initial evidence for why this may be 
the case: in our studies, we found that both belief in substance dualism and reductive 
physicalism are positively related to belief in determinism (Study 1). Specifically, while 
substance dualism is related to a belief in fatalistic determinism, reductive physicalism 
predicts scientific determinism (Study 2). These results were not explained by demographic 
variables such as age, gender, political orientation or education. Moreover, we found support 
for the hypothesis that belief in free will and in substance dualism are linked to peopleÕs 
tendency to rely on their intuitions to form their metaphysical beliefs (Study 2). The 
relationship between both constructs is however not entirely explained by intuitive thinking, 
suggesting that there might indeed be a causal connection between the two. Lastly, we found 
that a one-item pictorial measure of belief about mind-body relations used in past research 
primarily captures peopleÕs tendencies to believe in reductive physicalism (or the lack 
thereof), rather than in minds that can exist in the absence of a physical counterpart.  
3.1. Theoretical Contributions and Future Research 
 The present findings suggest that people have a more complex view on the 
relationship between mind and body than past unidimensional approaches would suggest. 
However, most existing scales assessing peopleÕs conception of mind-body relations fail to 
adequately capture these nuanced beliefs. A factor analysis performed on the items taken from 
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past research on mind-body beliefs revealed that lay people do in fact differentiate between 
belief in substance dualism and belief in reductive physicalism, and that both dimensions 
uniquely predict various subdimensions of belief in free will and determinism. In addition, 
both types of belief seem to be differentially related to people's tendency to rely on intuitive 
or rational thinking, further supporting the notion that they are distinct constructs. Notably, 
though, in the development of the FDI, Nadelhoffer and colleagues (2014) did not find their 
dualism-related items to load on two distinct factors. As they did not intend to test for such a 
factor structure (and therefore did not report an individual factor analysis for the dualism 
subscale), it is only possible for us to speculate on why this may be the case. Plausible reasons 
could be the formulation of the item wordings, the lower total number of items, or the 
(comparably large) correlation between both dimensions. Still, it may very well the case that, 
upon further investigation, one would find that responses to their dualism items can similarly 
be explained by an underlying two-factor structure. 
However, even a two-factorial conceptualization is most likely insufficient to fully 
capture people's beliefs about the relationship between mind and body. For example, it fails to 
properly assess beliefs related to property dualism, that is, beliefs that assume that mental 
states are something above and beyond physical states, yet cannot exists in the absence of the 
corresponding physical matter. Likewise, the present scale does not allow to assess peopleÕs 
belief in the causal relationship between the mental and the physical, regardless of whether 
they are conceptualized as different properties or substances. In other words, the present items 
cannot differentiate whether a person believes the mental can affect the physical and/or vice 
versa. In addition, the current scales are unable to assess belief in certain forms of non-
materialistic monism (such as idealism) or in panpsychism, the idea that every combination of 
physical matter has mental properties, including non-living entities. 
MIND-BODY DUALISM AND FREE WILL     36 
As such, future research efforts should focus on developing and validating more 
complex scales assessing various subdimensions of belief in mind-body relations in order to 
accurately assess how they may differentially predict various metaphysical and non-
metaphysical beliefs (such as in free will and determinism), as well as which cognitive 
processes may be responsible for their development. For example, a belief in idealism, while 
technically a non-dualist view on the world, may be compatible with a belief in free will, yet 
not necessarily. Idealism is the belief that something mental constitutes the sole foundation of 
reality (ontological idealism), or that although something non-mental may theoretically exist, 
one cannot acquire any knowledge about itÑsimilar to DescartesÕ cogito ergo sum argument 
(epistemological idealism; Guyer & Horstmann, 2016). Because it does not make any explicit 
claims about the nature of the physical universe, for example whether it adheres to the laws of 
cause and effect, idealism allows for belief in free will, in scientific determinism (if the 
physical world is merely construed as epistemologically inaccessible), and/or in fatalistic 
determinism.  
In addition, as outlined earlier, the causal direction between the concepts identified is 
not yet clear. While it seems to be that both a belief in substance dualism and in free will are 
related to an intuitive thinking style, future research may investigate these relationships in 
more detail to see if, for example, an experimental manipulation of thinking style affects 
responses to items assessing free will belief. Likewise, although past research has established 
a causal relation between intuitive thinking and unspecific belief in mind-body dualism 
(Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015), it would be interesting to assess which of the current sub-
dimensions of belief about mind-body relations (or those discovered by future research) are 
primarily affected by this thinking style.  
Similarly, after establishing a more thorough assessment of peopleÕs belief about 
mind-body relations, it is possible to investigate the causal relation between these beliefs and 
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beliefs in free will and determinism in more detail. In fact, both belief systems are ontological 
propositions about reality, presumably based on our subjective, phenomenological experience 
of the word. In addition, as outlined in the Introduction, they seem to logically depend on one 
another, yet were shown to be distinct constructs (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). While mind-body 
beliefs seem to be informed by what it feels like to perceive (as in p-consciousness or qualia), 
free will beliefs seem to be informed by what it feels like to act, both closely-related 
phenomenological states. As a belief about the relation between mind and body seems more 
abstract than about free will, we would propose a causal direction in which mind-body beliefs 
would causally affect free will beliefs. In fact, in a recent set of studies by Vonasch and 
colleagues (2018), the authors found that, on average, lay people believe that humans would 
have more free will if souls existed than if souls did not exist (corresponding to a belief in 
substance dualism). Notably, they asked participants about souls without any reference to 
religion or faith. Rather, participants considered souls to be something that is partly (yet not 
fully) responsible for making unconstrained conscious decisions, a notion that in turn 
informed their judgments about free will and responsibility. These results lend further support 
to our hypothesis that a belief in the existence of a non-material mental substance (such as a 
soul) and belief in free will are closely interlinked, and possibly causally related, concepts. 
Yet, to fully capture hypothesized causal effects with regard to the different facets of dualist 
beliefs, new manipulations for the two subdimensions identified would be needed. 
 A second aspect that could potentially be addressed in future work is whether and how 
people who subscribe to certain positions regarding the mind-body problem conceptualize 
free will: do people who endorse substance dualism or reductive physicalism have the same 
understanding of what it means to have Òfree willÓ? As detailed in the Introduction, people 
may have different conceptions about what it means to be free, that is, whether it entails 
having the ability to do otherwise, or whether it means to be able to act in accordance with 
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how one wishes to act. In a similar vein, people with different views on how minds relate to 
bodies may also differ with regard to how much they equate free will with moral 
responsibility and therefore criminal accountability. 
 In sum, the present research adds to the growing literature on how lay people think 
about metaphysical questions and which factors contribute to their beliefs. Yet, as outlined 
above, more research will be necessary to fully understand the intricacies of peopleÕs lay 
beliefs about minds and bodies, their views on whether people possess free will and/or 
whether the world is pre-determined by the laws of nature, how these different constructs may 
relate to one another, and what consequences this may have in peopleÕs minds for ascriptions 
of guilt, praise, reward, and punishment. The present research thus adds to our understanding 
of how people explain their own phenomenological consciousness, and may help to further 
investigate how these views affect our cognition, emotion and behavior.  
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